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FIDELITY TO THE BEST VERSION OF 
OURSELVES 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
Lawrence Sager2 
This is in the nature of a concurring opinion. I am in general 
sympathy with Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, and in awe 
of Jim Fleming’s breadth of understanding and capacity to engage 
so many theorists—many of them prickly—with patience, respect, 
and intelligence. 
A. THE PURPOSE OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE 
What is the purpose of our constitutional practice? That is 
the first, orienting question. Constitutional practice, rather than 
Constitution, because the authority of the written Constitution is 
derivative of its place within our practice. The text is in service of 
our practice; our practice is not in service of the text . . . at least 
not until we arrive at the conclusion that our practice is best 
served by an understanding that connects us to the text in this 
dominating way. If the text of the Constitution is appropriately 
understood as directing the behavior of actors in our political 
community, it is because the complex practice of 
constitutionalism—which includes that text—makes that 
behavior morally obligatory for such actors. This is a familiar 
observation, perhaps, but no less important for its familiarity. 
To be sure, on any understanding of our constitutional 
practice the written Constitution has an important place. The text 
is important in a number of ways, not least of which is that, absent 
 
 1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 2. Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair, University of Texas School of Law. 
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serious regard for the text, the people in their role as constituent 
sovereign have no way of insisting on a change of constitutional 
course. But the place of the written Constitution in our 
constitutional practice is defined secondarily, from outside the 
text, not commanded by the text. Like moral readers of our 
constitutional practice, originalists of all stripes have to argue 
from outside the text. This makes the new originalist turn to the 
theory of language come too early; the place of such theory is 
necessarily subordinate to a convincing moral account of our 
practice as a whole. 
The purpose I would claim for our constitutional practice is 
that it is justice-seeking.3 It aims at better aligning our institutions, 
policies, laws and the political community as a whole, with the 
requirements of justice. This, I think, is sympathetic with what Jim 
Fleming describes as the aspirational Constitution. I have only 
these small reasons for preferring this formulation: First, I think 
that it is useful to keep in mind that it is our constitutional practice 
that we are characterizing, not merely the Constitution. And 
second, justice-seeking sharpens the nature of our central 
constitutional aspirations; perhaps Jim prefers “aspirational” for 
the opposing reason, namely, that it is more capacious. 
B. DELEGATORY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
I want to turn now to a feature of the written Constitution 
that is morally salient to its role in our practice. Many provisions 
of the Constitution do not constitute encompassing commitments. 
For a provision of the Constitution to be “encompassing,” for our 
purposes, it must contain or constitute a full description of the 
state of affairs to which it refers. A Court, which undertook to 
enforce an encompassing constitutional provision, would have 
work to do—choices to make—but those choices would be among 
implementing strategies, not target states of affairs. Many—
perhaps most—of the liberty-bearing provisions of our 
Constitution are not encompassing in this way. 
Actually, no legal provision can be fully encompassing; there 
will always need to be some normative engagement with the text 
to establish its meaning. But let us agree that some provisions 
 
 3. For fuller development of my account of our constitutional practice as justice-
seeking, see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAIN CLOTHES: A THEORY OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). 
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reduce the amount of normative engagement to just this side of 
the vanishing point. This is true, for example, of the Constitution’s 
stipulation that neither “shall any person be eligible to th[e] 
Office [of the President] who shall not have attained to the Age 
of thirty five Years.”4 Other provisions, in contrast, leave broad 
space that plainly requires normative engagement to fill in. This 
is true, for example of the First Amendment’s free exercise clause: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”5 For practical 
purposes, we can regard provisions like the age requirement of 
the President as encompassing (or at least largely encompassing) 
and provisions like the free exercise clause as non-encompassing. 
The new, language-centered, originalists implicitly disfavor 
non-encompassing constitutional provisions. Consider the 
following new originalist typology of what we have called non-
encompassing constitutional provisions: A non-encompassing 
provision may be vague (susceptible to problematic boundaries at 
its margins); it may be ambiguous (susceptible to more than one 
meaning); it may be contradictory (in direct conflict with another 
provision), or it may leave gaps.6 There are two things to note 
about this list: The first is that its operative terms are not 
flattering; “vague,” “ambiguous,” “contradictory,” and riven with 
“gaps,” are far from terms of praise or even dispassion. They read 
like a list of the deadly faults of failed expression. And, if these 
characterizations of the open margins of non-encompassing 
constitutional provisions were accurate and exhaustive, the 
pejorative flavor of this typology would be earned. Avoidable or 
not, the open margins of non-encompassing constitutional 
provisions could be regarded as failed attempts to communicate 
complete instructions. 
But it is important at just this point to observe the second 
noteworthy feature of this new originalist list of the ways that 
constitutional provisions can be non-encompassing, namely, that 
it conspicuously omits what is by far the most important form of 
non-encompassing provisions in our Constitution. In an early 
work, and to a somewhat different end, Ronald Dworkin invoked 
the example of a soldier who is ordered by a superior officer to 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 6.    See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 479, 509–10 (2013). 
8 - SAGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/16  10:48 AM 
482 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:479 
 
find the best men or women for an important mission. That 
command clearly is not encompassing; an encompassing 
command would include the names of the soldiers who were to be 
charged with the mission. But it is not vague, ambiguous, 
contradictory, or gap-ridden; it is delegatory. Properly understood 
as a delegation, the command is complete; the superior officer has 
nothing to add, and the recipient of the command does not need 
anything further to fully understand his or her instruction. As a 
complete instruction, the command is altogether successful in 
communicating exactly what the superior officer wants its 
recipient to do. In like fashion, the delegatory provisions of the 
Constitution are complete and successful, notwithstanding their 
necessarily non-encompassing nature; to function as delegations 
these provisions must be non-encompassing. 
Suppose we encounter a constitutional provision like the free 
exercise clause. The language is somewhat unfamiliar, but we 
conclude that the best reading is something like “Congress must 
not constrict religious liberty.” That is surely non-encompassing. 
But it is best read as instructing a court or other responsible 
constitutional actor to fashion a jurisprudence aimed at assuring 
that the federal government’s behavior is consistent with religious 
liberty. That will require providing at least a rough theory of 
religious liberty, workable doctrine derived from and aimed at 
implementing that theory, and the application of that doctrine to 
individual cases (this last mostly by lower courts but with 
occasional intervention by the Supreme Court to adjust, refine 
and enforce the doctrine.) Ronald Dworkin and others have 
described the interpretive process of moving from a general target 
like religious liberty to an intermediate conceptual structure as 
the move from concept to conception.7 In the case of concepts as 
abstract as “religious liberty,” an intermediate conceptual 
structure surely is necessary to the judicial enterprise of 
fashioning implementing doctrine. In principle, I think, there is no 
reason to exclude the possibility that there could be more than 
one intermediate level, nested conceptual structures bridging the 
gap from the abstract basal concepts to concrete doctrines and 
case outcomes; there is nothing magical or exclusive about the 
notion of a conception. The important point for our purposes is 
that the non-encompassing nature of an abstract constitutional 
 
 7. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). 
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instruction of this sort is not a failure of expression; it is a 
complete and successful passing on of responsibility for providing 
encompassing content—it is a delegation. 
I anticipate a reaction to this observation that takes issue with 
the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause should be read as a 
delegation of responsibility and authority. But text and context 
press forcibly for that interpretation. “Congress shall make no law 
. . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”8 If we conclude that 
this is equivalent to “Congress shall make no law constricting 
religious liberty,” the most natural understanding of the provision 
is that anyone who is given or assumes responsibility for 
respecting the written Constitution has the concomitant 
responsibility of giving concrete content to the commitment. 
There is nothing surprising about this understanding; indeed it is 
hard to imagine what could be the content of a contrary 
interpretation. If, in our military example, the commanding 
officer handed his subordinate a written order, with a description 
of the mission, followed by the instruction “[w]e need the six most 
qualified members of your squadron for this mission,” the 
delegation of responsibility would be plain. So too is it plain in the 
case of the delegatory provisions of the Constitution. 
Many of the most important provisions of the written 
Constitution—particularly the liberty-bearing provisions—are 
delegatory. This not an arbitrary circumstance or simply a matter 
of drafter’s taste. By design the Constitution is obdurate to 
change, and demanding of a broad national consensus for 
enactment and amendment. These structural features of the 
ratification and amendment processes encourage delegatory 
commitments to abstract principles of justice: Generality 
conduces to the necessary broad consensus; and thoughtful 
participants in the process of textual composition will see the 
virtue of abstraction in substantive commitments intended to 
endure for generations. Further, the use of delegatory 
pronouncements invites the partnership of contemporary 
constitutional actors, including and especially courts; thoughtful 
drafters could see that as a benefit. 
The prevalence of delegatory provisions in our written 
Constitution does not insist on the moral reading of our 
constitutional practice. But it deprives opponents of the moral 
 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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reading of any claim of support from the text of the Constitution 
and the technology of linguistic analysis. Actually, the problem 
posed by the delegatory provisions of the Constitution for text-
centered opponents of the moral reading runs deeper than that; 
having turned to the text for instruction, they find instructions for 
constitutional actors like judges that require moral judgment to 
fulfill the authority delegated by the text. Think again of our 
soldier, commanded to find the best members of his or her 
squadron to undertake a mission. Were the soldier to demur on 
the grounds that this choice belonged to the superior officer, they 
would be disobeying the order. This means that reflective 
originalists need non-textual reasons to oppose the moral reading; 
and further, that it is very hard indeed for reflective originalists to 
resist some version of the moral reading—as Jim Fleming so 
carefully and effectively argues throughout his manuscript. 
C. COURTS 
If, as I argued at the outset, the question is not how the text 
directs our practice, but rather, what our practice should make of 
the text, we need to understand what virtues and liabilities flow 
from the judicial undertaking to discharge the judgmental 
responsibility of the numerous delegatory provisions in the text. 
We need to think about courts: How they work and what 
advantages and disadvantages they offer with regard to process 
and outcome. This is a complex question, which is crucially 
important to the question of whether our justice-seeking 
constitutional practice is advantaged if constitutional courts 
robustly embrace the moral view of our constitutional practice, 
and with it, the written Constitution, and its many delegatory 
provisions. This is a question which is all too easily neglected by 
approaches to our constitutional practice that make the text and 
linguistic analysis the center of reflective attention from the 
outset. 
Our view of courts is crucial because the moral view of our 
constitutional practice gives them substantial authority and 
responsibility to set the concrete shape of important liberties, 
realms of equality, and normative elements in our structure of 
governance (most notably, the distribution of authority between 
the federal government and the states). I hold our constitutional 
courts in relatively high regard. I want to say a little about why, 
because the reasons why we should hold courts in high regard give 
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us reasons in turn to argue for a view of the best shape of 
constitutional adjudication. Remember, our practice is justice-
seeking and justice is both our purpose and the lens through which 
we consider our practice itself. 
Here is a rough sketch of the case for the robust role of courts 
in our constitutional practice: Our constitutional courts are 
common law courts; they are, that is, reason-giving and precedent-
drawn (We could say precedent-bound, but something less 
absolute—on the order of Dworkin’s “gravitational pull”9—is apt; 
hence precedent-drawn.) Common law courts are obliged to give 
reasons grounded in general principles for the decision in the case 
before them; and those reasons need to account as well both for 
what is valued in past outcomes, and, for attractive outcomes in 
future, imaginable cases. The process of making all this line up is 
the institutional equivalent of seeking reflective equilibrium. A 
simple example: Think of a judge deciding whether members of 
the American Nazi Party have a right to march and spread their 
vile message of hate in Ferguson, Missouri. How do the reasons 
and outcome to which she is attracted in the case before her 
square with her court’s view of the appropriate outcome in Selma, 
Alabama decades ago? And how would they seem in a future 
case, as applied, say, to war protestors in a military town in Texas 
in time of active national military activity? (There may or may not 
be convincing moral grounds for distinguishing among these cases 
. . . the point is that they place a burden of articulate justification 
on the judge.) 
There are several virtues to this institutional form of 
reflective equilibration. First, it conduces to fairness. As despised 
as the American Nazi Party is, as a First Amendment 
constitutional protagonist, the Party potentially stands in the 
shoes of Martin Luther King and future anti-war protestors. 
Second, reflective equilibration is a staple of practical reasoning 
about normative questions; it gives courts a judgmental capacity 
not shared by other institutions of government. And third, in 
principle, constitutional courts have the distinct democratic virtue 
of giving each claimant the opportunity to invoke the regime of 
principle to which the Court is on an ongoing basis committed, 
without reference to the number of votes or number of dollars 
that support their claim. So it is possible for an accused terrorist 
 
 9. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 111-15. 
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from Yemen, with a limited education in a foreign land, to clash 
with the Secretary of Defense . . . to clash and to prevail in the 
Supreme Court. This is an important and democracy-enhancing 
form of equality—we can call it deliberative equality. 
These are reasons to think that constitutional courts are well-
suited for the role they are called upon to play by the moral 
reading of our constitutional practice. That role is one in which—
especially with regard to the Constitution’s liberty-bearing 
provisions—the text speaks at a relatively high level of moral 
abstraction, and courts have a significant role in responding to the 
text’s moral calls with more concrete substantive understandings 
and still more concrete implementing doctrine. Courts do this in 
the name of our constitutional practice, as the most conspicuous 
and settled delegees of the authority conferred on the text by our 
practice and delegated by the text to responsible constitutional 
actors. 
Respect for the tug of prior decisions, and, more generally, 
for the processes of common law adjudication, is important at 
every turn of this account of the virtues of the constitutional 
judiciary. But in the broader debate between originalist and moral 
understandings of our constitutional practice, this salient 
institutional feature of our practice may sometimes be lost to 
view. For the staunch originalist, what grounds an appropriate 
constitutional outcome is the enacted text and various facts about 
the world at the moment of enactment. The discovery of and 
respect for those textual and contextual facts is central and the 
process of adjudication secondary and subordinate. 
The moral understanding of our constitutional practice 
should lead more naturally to concerns about the structure and 
virtue of our common law judicial practice. But even here there 
are potential diversions. A moral reader of our constitutional 
practice may well be drawn, as is James Fleming in Fidelity to Our 
Imperfect Constitution, to Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive 
approach, which entails a balance of sorts between fit and value. 
(pp. 99-108) Dworkinian interpretation enters the project of 
understanding the law at a number of different conceptual levels. 
Two are important for our present purposes. First, the project of 
understanding law in general, or our constitutional practice more 
specifically is an interpretive project; and second, what courts do 
when they make judgments about the content of the law is itself 
an interpretive enterprise. Without more, the general fit/value 
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elements of interpretation concede a role of considerable 
importance to what is already in place . . . we are interpreting, not 
inventing. Hence the element of fit, which has both a threshold 
minimum requirement and continues beyond that threshold to 
exert important force over the shape of the interpretive outcome. 
But it is important to recognize that judicial interpretation is 
appropriately understood to include a distinct and robust element 
of regard for past adjudicated outcomes, beyond the naturally 
backward looking element of fit in interpretative endeavors 
generally. In part, that regard grows out of the nature of law 
generally; in part, it is particular to the nature of adjudication in a 
common law system. I have argued that the efficacy and 
legitimacy of our constitutional practice depends on the common 
law protocols that shape constitutional adjudication. Moral 
readers of our constitutional practice need to attend to the virtues 
and liabilities of courts and constitutional adjudication. Affording 
too little weight to precedent may undermine the claims for the 
robust role adjudication plays in the moral view of our 
constitutional practice. 
D. FIDELITY 
Jim Fleming has made fidelity the governing virtue of 
constitutional actors. And there is something very attractive 
about fidelity. It bespeaks constancy to an object worthy of it. But 
the sense of unwavering commitment seems somewhat at odds 
with what Fleming most deeply believes in, namely, constitutional 
progress, which implicates change. I confess that some of 
Fleming’s formulations seem in this way misaligned, including his 
overarching “Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution.” Clearly we 
do not aim at being faithful to imperfection or constant to change. 
What is it in our constitutional practice that is worthy of our 
fidelity? This is my suggestion: Our constitutional practice 
represents a sustained effort to be the best version of ourselves as 
a people. That is an aspiration worthy of the fidelity of all 
constitutional actors: judges, scholars, legislators, and members of 
our political community in their official capacity as voters. 
 
